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Re-Embodying Law
by Steven L. Winter*
It was fun to watch the audience of mostly first-year students during
Mark Johnson's presentation. Seven weeks into their first semester of
law school, this was clearly the most fun they had had so far. And it
was easy to see why: law school takes place "from the neck up," so to
speak. It is so relentlessly about reason abstracted from the ordinary
interests, passions, and other embodied considerations of everyday (not
to mention college) life. This deracination of law is ritualized metaphori-
cally in the black robes that enshroud our judges' bodies as if to say,
"See, it is all from the neck up." And that is one of the most wonderful
things about the work that Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have been
doing: it reconnects us to ourselves in our embodied wholeness-as not
just minds, but as embodied human beings.
This classic Western opposition between mind and body-and its
correlates, such as reason and the passion, logic and rhetoric, etc.-is
mirrored in twentieth-century legal theory's absorption with the problem
of meaningful constraints on judicial decisionmaking and the consequent
danger of unchecked subjectivity. The fear, conventionally identified
with the Supreme Court's infamous decision in Lochner v. New York,'
is that without constraints, judges and other powerful legal actors will
be free to impose their personal values. On this view, law operates as
law only if there is some disciplining, external constraint on the
discretion of the legal decisionmaker. In Frank Michelman's words, law
is "an autonomous force" that provides "an external untouchable rule of
the game."2 This constraint may be an objective quality of the legal
* Walter S. Gibbs Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University Law School.
Yeshiva University (B.A., 1974); Columbia University School of Law (J.D., 1977). This
Article is adapted from my book A CLEARING IN THE FOREsT: LAW, LIFE, & MIND (2001),
published by the University of Chicago Press and is reprinted with permission.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Frank Michelman, Political Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL Aviv STUDiEs IN LAW
287 (1988).
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materials-that is, of the facts and holdings of the cases-or a higher-
order reason grounded in general concepts or rules, the intent of the
Framers, political theory, moral philosophy, or as is current today, the
utilitarian rationality of microeconomics and rational choice theory. But,
in each of these cases, the structure of legal reasoning is essentially the
same: it strives to reduce a complex problem to a policy, principle,
propositional rule, or some other set of necessary and sufficient criteria.
In theory, these definitional criteria will allow professionals to delineate
legal categories with greater precision, draw appropriate distinctions,
and then make correct decisions.
Now, as Mark Johnson points out in his paper, one obvious problem
with this approach is that it makes it more difficult to explain how the
law changes and adapts to new social circumstances. This observation
is part of a larger point about the development of rationality: human
intelligence, including the capacity to categorize, arose as a successful
evolutionary adaptation. In the words of the Nobel-winning biologist
Gerald Edelman, "evolution teaches us that the selection of animals
formed to carry out functions that increase their fitness is at the very
heart of the matter."' We know from evolutionary biology that rigid
systems rarely survive because they are maladaptive. It only makes
sense, therefore, that as an evolutionary development, human rationality
would be flexible and adaptive rather than rigidly propositional and
truth-conditional. Metaphoric thought is one of the principal (but not
exclusive) forms of an adaptive human intelligence.
So far, so good. But notice that this account also creates a problem.
One way to make a propositional legal category-say, the rule that once
required personal presence within the state as a prerequisite to the
exercise of state court jurisdiction-adaptable to new circumstances is
to extend it via metaphor. Thus, under the regime of Pennoyer v. Neff,4
a court could exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation if it
did sufficient business in the state that "the corporation shall have come
into the state."5 The legal realists decried such metaphors and legal
fictions as "transcendental nonsense" that afflicted formalist legal
reasoning. As Felix Cohen caustically observed:
3. GERALD M. EDELMAN, THE REMEMBERED PRESENT: A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 31 (1989).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917).
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Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it incorporates
in one state and has agents transacting corporate business in another
state, is not a question that can be answered by empirical observation.
Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in
corporations if we don't believe in angels? To be sure some of us have
seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. (just as some of us
have seen angelic deeds, angelic countenances, etc.). But this does not
give us the right to hypostatize, to "thingify," the corporation, and to
assume that it travels about from State to State as mortal men travel.6
Within the classic Western oppositions, metaphor has historically been
understood as subjective and a matter of mere rhetoric. Thus, Locke
condemned metaphor and other figurative speech as "perfect cheat" and
insisted upon literal prose "if we would speak of Things as they are." '
In their critique of legal metaphor, the realists were relying on this
classic conception. In his famous article on fundamental legal concep-
tions, Hohfeld complained: "Much of the difficulty, as regards legal
terminology, arises from the fact that many of our words were originally
applicable only to physical things; so that their use in connection with
legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional." In much
the same vein, Cohen objected: "When the vivid fictions and metaphors
of traditional jurisprudence are thought of as reasons for decisions,
rather than poetical or mnemonic devices . . ., then [one] . . . is apt to
forget the social forces which mold the law ... . On the bench, judges
as distinguished as Benjamin Cardozo and Charles Evan Hughes warned
against the distortions caused by metaphors in law.'°
6. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L.
REV. 809, 810-11 (1935) (emphasis omitted).
7. JOHN LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 508 (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690).
8. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913) (footnote omitted).
9. Cohen, supra note 6, at 812.
10. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors
in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end
often by enslaving it."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in LAW
AND LITERATURE 100 (1931) ("A metaphor, however, is, to say the least, a shifting test
whereby to measure degrees of guilt that mean the difference between life and death.");
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346, 354 (1911) (Hughes,
C.J.) ("When it is said that intangible property, such as credits on open account, have their
situs at the creditor's domicile, the metaphor does not aid. Being incorporeal, they can
have no actual situs."); New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366, 372 (1937)
(Hughes, C.J.) ("When we speak of a 'business situs' of intangible property in the taxing
State we are indulging in a metaphor.").
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Legal metaphor, in other words, is a double-edged sword. On one
hand, metaphorical thought makes possible the flexibility that law needs
if it is to accommodate the complexities of social life. On the other hand,
if a putatively propositional law changes via metaphor, then this
transformation vitiates the constraint supposedly provided by the law's
criterial logic.
This is the kind of conundrum that drives conventional scholars into
paroxyms of platitudes about maintaining stability in the face of change.
But we can do better. To do so, we need to understand first, that human
rationality is not linear and criterial to begin with, but imaginative and
adaptive (that is, involving metaphor, image-schemas, metonymies, and
radial categories); second, that imaginative thought (including metaphor)
is systematic and regular rather than arbitrary and unconstrained; and
third, that innovation (whether via metaphor or otherwise) is itself a
contingent and, therefore, highly constrained phenomenon. Legal
metaphor presents neither the problems perceived by the realists nor
those feared by conventional scholars. That is because, as I hope to
demonstrate, successful legal metaphor derives its force from the very
discipline of constraint that defines its conditions of possibility.
In the next two sections, I will walk you through two familiar
examples of innovative argument in constitutional law. The first is the
landmark case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,11 in which the
Supreme Court made what is widely understood as a radical break with
prior Commerce Clause 2 doctrine. The second is Holmes's introduction
of the "marketplace of ideas" as the organizing metaphor for modern free
speech doctrine. In the third section, I examine the restrictive implica-
tions of the market metaphor and its relation to the much troubled but
still oft-invoked speech/conduct distinction. In each of these cases, we
will closely observe the constitutive relationship between imagination
and constraint, innovation, and contingency.
I. STREAMLINING COMMERCE
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1937 decision inNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.13 upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act.14 The case marked a watershed in Commerce Clause
analysis and, as one of the two "switch in time that saved nine" cases,
reflected a major shift in the legal/social consensus on the constitutional
11. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
13. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14. Id. at 30.
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status of the regulatory programs of the New Deal.'5 Hughes's
landmark opinion is often read as rejecting the "stream of commerce"
metaphor in favor of a realistic assessment of congressional power over
commerce. But a closer reading of Hughes's opinion shows him
refashioning, rather than refusing, the stream of commerce metaphor.
Though Hughes radically reorganized Commerce Clause doctrine, he did
not operate free-form. Rather, he worked with the metaphorical
material already in the cases to refashion the doctrine in a manner that
was simultaneously constrained and enabled by the very precedents he
was rejecting.
The National Labor Relations Board had found that the Jones &
Laughlin company coerced, intimidated, and discriminated against its
employees in an effort to prevent unionization.16 As the case came to
the Supreme Court, the primary question was jurisdictional: could the
federal government exercise its Commerce Clause power to regulate
labor relations in manufacturing?
1 7
The steel manufacturer relied on the Court's decision in United States
v. E.C. Knight Co.,'" which declared that manufacturing is not com-
merce.' 9  Although the distinction seems tendentious today, this
position is firmly rooted in a rationalist, criterial logic that distinguishes
manufacturing and commerce according to the rigors of a P-or-not-P
categorization. This rationalist paradigm was also mirrored in the
categorical approach to the federalism question taken by Justice
McReynolds in his dissent:
One who produces or manufactures a commodity, subsequently sold
and shipped by him in interstate commerce .... has engaged in two
distinct and separate activities. So far as he produces or manufactures
a commodity, his business is purely local. So far as he sells and ships
... the commodity to customers in another state, he engages in
interstate commerce. In respect of the former, he is subject only to
regulation by the state; in respect of the latter, to regulation only by
the federal government. 0
The use of the CONTAINER schema for categorization fit well with the
geopolitical structure of federalism: since manufacturing "is purely
15. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 6-11 (1984); Bruce
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1053-57
(1984).
16. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
17. See id. at 29.
18. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
19. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 39.
20. Id. at 79 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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local," it "is subject only to regulation by the state."2 ' Thus, everything
had only a single essence: either commerce or manufacture; either
federal or state; either P-or-not-P; either in the container (manufacturing
= within state borders) or across its boundaries (commerce = federal
power). The dissent in Jones & Laughlin relied, as well, on the
traditional distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
commerce, 22 a fuzzy distinction that the dissent defended with an ironic
quote from a previous Hughes opinion: "'The precise line can be drawn
only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in princi-
ple."
28
The Board and the Solicitor General, on the other hand, invoked the
Court's stream of commerce precedents.24 In its opinion finding an
unfair labor practice, the Board invoked the conventional personification
metaphor for a corporation and elaborated on its fluid entailment, held
in common with the stream of commerce metaphor, by using a cardiovas-
cular analogy.25 As quoted in Hughes's opinion, the Board had argued
that the steel plant
might be likened to the heart of a self-contained, highly integrated
body. They draw in the raw materials from Michigan, Minnesota, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania in part through arteries and by means
controlled by the respondent; they transform the materials and then
pump them out to all parts of the nation through the vast mechanism
which the respondent has elaborated."
Similarly, the Solicitor argued that the company's "activities constitute
a 'stream' or 'flow' of commerce, of which the ... manufacturing plant
is the focal point."
27
21. Id.
22. Id. at 96; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1936); Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905).
23. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (quoting Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)). The notion of a "precise line"
implicates rationalist assumptions about categorization. In contrast, the characterization
of the distinction as only "clear in principle" can be taken to reflect the fact that "direct"
and "indirect" are structured radially with relatively clear central cases and relatively
indeterminate peripheries.
24. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 35 (majority opinion); see Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495 (1922); Swift, 196 U.S. at 399.
25. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 27. On the conventional use of the personification
metaphor to structure our understanding of a "corporation," see Steven L. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163-65 (1989).
26. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 35.
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Hughes's response was overtly self-conscious of the metaphoric
characterization of commerce, designating with quotation marks the
references to the "stream," "flow," and "throat" of commerce. But
Hughes was neither solicitous of the company's criterial argument nor
disdainful of the government's metaphors. Rather, his classic response
elaborated and extended those metaphors:
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of
defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the "stream of
commerce" cases. The instances in which that metaphor has been used
are but particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective
power which the Government invokes in support of the present Act.
The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign
commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action
springing from other sources. The fundamental principle is that the
power to regulate commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate
legislation" for "its protection and advancement" ... "and it is
primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger
and meet it."28
It is conventional to read this passage as dismissing the relevance of
the stream of commerce metaphor and adopting, instead, a broader and
more pragmatic view of Congress's power over commerce. But a careful
reading suggests otherwise. What Hughes rejected was the criterial
distinction between manufacturing and commerce-finding it unneces-
sary "to determine whether these features of defendant's business
dispose of the asserted analogy to the 'stream of commerce' cases."29
Hughes then rejected the essentialism of the prior doctrine: Congress's
authority, he remarked, "is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of the 'flow' of ... commerce." °
Manufacturing may be different than commerce, Hughes seems to be
saying, but that way of thinking about the question is simply beside the
point.
Rather than rejecting the conventional stream of commerce metaphor,
Hughes sliced through to its underlying conceptualization; he treated the
metaphor as "but [a] particular, and not exclusive, illustration[]."31
What it illustrates is an underlying image-schema: the stream of
commerce image is merely one metaphorical elaboration of the SOURCE-
28. Id. at 36-37 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564 (1871)).
29. Id. at 36.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id.
2006] 875
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PATH-GOAL schema. Turning to this more basic level of cognitive
operation, Hughes elaborated other metaphorical entailments: suppose
commerce is conceptualized not as a stream but, in the government's
metaphor, as "a great movement of iron ore, coal and limestone along
well-defined paths."2 If commerce is a movement along a path, it can
be personified as a traveler. In that case, we would not want to slow it
down by undue burdens or allow its progress to be impeded by obstruc-
tions. Most important of all, we would not want it to be waylaid by
attacks from ambush by the side of the road-that is, harms "due to
injurious action springing from other sources.3 3 And, at the very least,
we would want to see that it got off to a safe start on its journey: as
Hughes asked rhetorically, "of what avail is it to protect the facilit[ies]
of transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the
commodities to be transported!"'
By this point in his opinion, Hughes has thoroughly reorganized the
conceptual model for the commerce power from one premised on a
STREAM metaphor to one premised on the much richer JOURNEY
metaphor. By reconceptualizing commerce in this way, Hughes changed
the question in a way that structured a new constitutional answer; for
these different metaphors entail different conceptions of the federal role.
If commerce is a stream, then Congress's job is to regulate the flow and
keep it free of obstructions. If, however, commerce is a traveler on a
journey, then it would be absurd to exclude from consideration matters
outside the "flow" of commerce; it is precisely there that danger is most
likely to lurk. The concern becomes not just obstructions, but harms of
all sorts--"throttling," "danger," "injurious action springing from other
sources.""5 The correlative congressional power shifts from "regulation"
to "protection." Congress no longer monitors the sluice gates of
commerce; it becomes the interstate police protecting the always-
vulnerable traveler. "The fundamental principle" is now that Congress
is charged with the "protection and advancement" of commerce, "and it
is primarily for Congress to consider ... the danger and [to] meet it."35
In the end, Hughes made his point not by a rigorous propositional
argument from policy or principle but by a cognitive and metaphorical
tour de force.
Still, for the argument to have been persuasive, something more was
required. Without doubt, the social and political pressure on the Court
32. Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 36, 37, 42.
36. Id. at 37.
876 [Vol. 58
RE-EMBODYING LAW
to abandon its opposition to the New Deal-which reached a highwater
mark with Roosevelt's infamous court-packing plan3 7 -was a crucial
factor. But this crisis did not occur in a vacuum. It was, in part, a
reflection of decades of industrialization and change that had fueled a
more general jurisprudential crisis. In his intellectual history of the
period, Edward Purcell observes:
The state of American law invited and even necessitated the devastat-
ing attacks of the realists. The inconsistencies between the practices
of a rapidly changing industrial nation and the claims of a mechanical
juristic system had grown so acute by the 1920s that, in the minds of
many, the orthodox jurisprudence could no longer justify and explain
contemporary practice.'M
Perhaps nowhere was this more clear than in Commerce Clause doctrine,
which was in a state of advanced category breakdown.
The stream of commerce metaphor dates to Holmes's 1905 opinion in
Swift & Co. v. United States,3 9 which used the phrase "current of
commerce."0 Before the advent of the railroads, the streams referred
to in Commerce Clause cases were quite literal. Thus, in 1824, Justice
Marshall wrote: "The deep streams which penetrate our country in
every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the
Union, and furnish the means of exercising" the right to engage in
foreign commerce.41 Even so, commerce was sufficiently underdevel-
oped so that it would be another twenty-five years before the Court
asserted admiralty jurisdiction over interior waterways above the
tidewaters. 2
As long as transportation remained difficult, expensive, or slow-and
prior to the development of refrigeration--one could identify what
37. Although the origins of the court-packing plan are unknown, the idea had been
suggested by Llewellyn as early as 1934. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution As an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 n.33, 39 n;45 (1934).
38. EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 79 (1973).
39. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
40. Id. at 399.
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824). The "stream of commerce" metaphor thus
had a grounding in historical experience.
42. As the Court subsequently explained:
From the organization of the government until the era of steamboat navigation,
it is not strange that no question of this kind came before this court. The
commerce carried on upon the inland waters prior to that time was so small, that
cases were not likely to arise requiring the aid of admiralty courts.
The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555, 562 (1866) (discussing The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443
(1851)) (overruling The Thomas Jefferson, 21 U.S. 428 (1825)).
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seemed like more or less local markets in which goods (especially
perishables) were created, sold, and consumed without actually crossing
state boundaries." But the advent of the steamboat, the railroad, and
the automobile successively transformed American commerce. By the
late nineteenth century, it was increasingly difficult to distinguish
between interstate commerce subject to regulation by the national
government and those economic transactions that were strictly
intrastate."
The increasing blurring of these lines spawned a series of ultimately
untenable distinctions. Early on, in E.C. Knight, the Court distin-
guished between manufacturing that was local and commerce that, when
interstate, could be regulated by Congress."5 In Swift Holmes avoided
the force of this precedent by distinguishing between cases where the
effects on commerce are "accidental, secondary, remote or merely
probable" and those where the effects on commerce are the "direct
object," a "necessary consequence" or "primary end."' In distinguishing
a monopoly over sugar production from monopoly control over stock-
yards, Holmes used a metaphor to characterize the difference between
the cases:
[Clommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but
a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle are
sent for sale from a place in one State [to] another... with only the
interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, ... the
current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and
the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce."
Before Jones & Laughlin, the Court used Holmes's metaphorical
conception to distinguish between goods passing through "the current or
flow of interstate commerce" and those same goods once they had come
43. Whether such markets were truly "local," rather than connected and economically
interdependent, is open to question. The point, however, is that one could conceive of such
local markets containing only local goods.
44. As early as 1870, Justice Field remarked that
we are unable to draw any clear and distinct line between the authority of
Congress to regulate an agency employed in commerce between the States, when
that agency extends through two or more States, and when it is confined in its
action entirely within the limits of a single State.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 566.
45. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 15; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888); Carter Coal,
298 U.S. at 299-303.
46. Swift, 196 U.S. at 397.
47. Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
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to rest in "a place of final destination." In Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States," for example, Hughes reasoned:
The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a
State does not mean that the flow continues after the property has
arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within
the State and is there held solely for local disposition and use. So far
as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate
commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest
within the State.49
The increasingly tenuous nature of the Court's distinctions reflected the
obvious difficulty of trying to harmonize a nineteenth-century concept of
federalism with a twentieth-century industrialized economy. Ultimately,
this project could not be maintained given the substantial changes in the
relevant social practices. As Edward Levi observed, changes in the
method of commerce made it hard to distinguish between transactions
"previously remote and local" and those more extensive and intertwined
dealings that comprise the modern interstate economy: "Since the
difference could no longer be felt, it fell away."5°
II. "FIRE" IN A CROWDED MARKET
As in other areas of constitutional law, we tend anachronistically to
assume that the First Amendment we know is, if not the same, then at
least continuous with that of the Framers. But the social distance
between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries is simply too vast for
that degree of continuity to be plausible. Not only are there significant
doctrinal differences between the two periods, but the metaphorical
conceptions of free speech and the social circumstances and understand-
ings that supported them are radically different.
At its inception, the First Amendment was understood narrowly to
guard only against prior restraints of speech. After the fact, false, or
unpopular speech could be punished with a variety of coercive govern-
mental sanctions. As Leonard Levy reports of the pre-Revolutionary
period: "Everywhere unlimited liberty existed to praise the American
cause; . . . 'liberty of speech,' as Arthur M. Schlesinger so aptly said,
'belonged solely to those who spoke the speech of liberty.'"51 Even after
the adoption of the First Amendment, a Federalist-dominated Congress
48. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
49. Id. at 543; accord Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 305-06.
50. EDWARD H. LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 103 (1949).
51. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss 173 (1985).
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enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, making it a crime falsely
to defame the government.5 2
It is easy to dismiss this partisan attitude toward speech as narrow
and hypocritical. But there is more here than meets the eye, for this
attitude reflects a coherent view of free speech with substantial
historical roots. The Areopagitica, John Milton's famous seventeenth-
century polemic against licensing of the press, framed the free speech
argument as an argument for truth: "Truth is compar'd in Scripture to
a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetuall progression,
they sick'n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition." 3 The
biblical metaphor invoked by Milton-which we can represent with the
mnemonic KNOWLEDGE IS WATER-provides a systematic set of entail-
ments: water (in its various forms) maps onto knowledge; the current
(as in a river or stream) maps onto intellectual progress; the experience
of stagnant and, therefore, unhealthy waters maps onto the kind of
conventional wisdom that amounts to nothing more than the build-up of
prejudice and error; and the water's source maps onto God. (See Figure
A) These entailments, moreover, have specific substantive implications:
if truth is a "streaming fountain," the evil to be avoided is the blockage
that would interrupt "the free flow of ideas" and thus impede progress
toward "truth." The objection to licensing was that it might stifle that
progress by stopping or constricting the emergence of new ideas.
Figure A
Knowledge is Water
Source Domain Target Domain
Physical >>> Mental
water >>> knowledge
current >>> intellectual progress
stagnant waters >>> conventional wisdom
(clichd)
water's source >>> God (source of truth)
stoppage of water's flow >>> prior restraint (licensing)
52. See An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
53. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING, To THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), reprinted in THE PROSE OF JOHN
MILTON 265, 310 (J.M. Patrick ed., 1967) (all spellings as in original) (footnotes omitted).
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Consistent with its religious origins, the commitment to unrestrained
speech was bound to a strong concept of truth. This is what explains the
apparent hypocrisy of the founding period's partisan attitude toward
speech: belief in the importance of free speech could go hand-in-hand
with the notion of subsequent punishment because a strong belief in
truth provided the necessary theoretical assurance that after-the-fact
judgments could meaningfully distinguish the true from the false and
unprotected. And this was the case not only for Milton, (who knew
"Iruth as strong next to the Almighty"), but also for his Enlightenment
successors ("We hold these truths to be self-evident"). 54  Indeed, the
important innovation of the founding period-carried forward in Section
3 of the Sedition Act-was the notion that truth was a defense to
seditious libel.5 Under English law, the truth of the libel was an
aggravating factor because a slanderous statement about the King that
was in fact true was even more likely to undermine his authority than
a false one.56
This truth-based conception of free speech, organized around the "free
flow" and "open encounter" metaphors, provided only a limited, relatively
primitive model for First Amendment doctrine; indeed, the history of
First Amendment law before the twentieth century is remarkably thin.
A truly modern First Amendment had to await a more productive
conceptual model-one whose compositional structure transcended the
limitations of the earlier truth-based conception. That model emerged
from Holmes's World War I opinions.
It took a while, however. Initially, Holmes affirmed the traditional
view. In 1919 Holmes wrote three opinions for a unanimous Court
affirming convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917"7 for urging
resistance to the World War I draft.5" The lead case was that of
Charles Schenck, the general secretary of the Socialist Party, who had
published leaflets counseling resistance.5" Holmes clumsily allowed
that: "It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom
of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them
54. Id. at 328; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
55. 1 Stat. 570 (1798); An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled "An Act for the
Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States," 1 Stat. 596 (July 14, 1798).
56. See Paul Finkelman, Politics, The Press and the Law: An Introduction to the Trial
of John Peter Zenger in A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WAKING JOURNAL 11-13 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
57. 40 Stat. 217 (191.7).
58. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
59. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-50.
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may have been the main purpose." ° Yet, the bottom line remained the
same. As Holmes famously put it: "The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic."6 More than a hundred years after the Sedition Act,
it was still the case that, once spoken, false or potentially injurious
speech remained amenable to repressive governmental sanctions.
In just eight months, however, Holmes would change his position
dramatically. According to the conventional account, Holmes's sudden
emergence as a free speech champion was due primarily to the influence
of Zacharia Chafee.62 But there was something more profound at work
in Holmes's thought; otherwise, he would neither have found Chafee's
arguments persuasive nor would he have changed position so quickly.
With hindsight, moreover, we can find clues to Holmes's sudden
transition in his Schenck opinion.
Consider the problems posed by Holmes's analogy in Schenck. The
analogy consists of a mapping from the source domain of a person falsely
shouting fire in a crowded theater to the target domain of a political
activist advocating resistance to the draft.' The analogy maps the
immediate and catastrophic effect of creating a panic in a crowded
theater onto the harm to the war effort that might ensue if many young
men took up the call to resistance. (See Figure B) The analogy works
only to the extent that the call to resistance is likely to motivate
immediate and widespread action; that, precisely, is the burden of the
"clear and present danger" test that Holmes first proposed in Schenck.6
But even were the exigency real, the analogy would nevertheless be
incomplete because it presupposes that opposition to the war is, in some
crucial sense, false. One need only consider our reaction to the person
who, upon seeing the first lick of the flames at the theater curtains,
quietly exits without alerting his or her fellow patrons. Falsely shouting
"Fire" in a crowded theater is one thing. But crying "Fire" in a burning
theater is something else again.
60. Id. at 51-52.
61. Id. at 52.
62. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 427-30 (1993) (noting, too, the influence of Frankfurter, Laski, and Hand).
63. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
64. Id. ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent").
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Figure B
Source Domain Target Domain
shouting fire >>> advocating resistance to
the draft
in a crowded theater >>> during wartime
causing a panic >>> "clear and present
danger" to the war effort
falsely >>> thus making the world
unsafe for democracy,
etc.
To say that advocating resistance to the draft is like falsely shouting
fire in a crowded theater, one must first be confident that the war is
something like the noble cause claimed-making the world safe for
democracy, the war to end all wars-and not itself an incendiary evil.
For it is one thing to obstruct the war effort in times of genuine national
peril, but it is quite another matter to oppose the country's involvement
in a bloody foreign conflict that, like the war in Iraq, will prove a tragic
mistake. In other words, to equate Schenck's acts with those of the
person who falsely shouts "Fire" in a crowded theater, one must be
prepared to say that it is the conventional wisdom about the country's
participation in the war which represents the truth.
But that is precisely what Holmes would not have been prepared to
say. Holmes was a Social Darwinist and, on his own report, a life-long
cynic. As he wrote in 1918: "I used to say, when I was young, that
truth was the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others."65
It was this recognition of the contingency of truth that lay behind his
famous dissent in Lochner insisting on judicial deference to legislative
action: in that case Holmes affirmed "the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law" and, accordingly, was skeptical of the Court's
attempt "to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion." 6 Yet,
as Holmes soon came to realize, the same skepticism was in order when
the attempt to forestall change came from the dominant majority itself.
As he later wrote in dissent in Gitlow v. New York:67 "If in the long
run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of
free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
way."68
65. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
68. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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It was this more skeptical, evolutionary view that ultimately won
Holmes over. Just eight months after Schenck, in Abrams v. United
States,69 Holmes dissented from the Court's affirmance of yet another
Espionage Act conviction.7" "Persecution for the expression of opin-
ions," he said:
seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises
or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposi-
tion.... But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market. 7
1
This passage has provided the critical metaphor for the twentieth-cen-
tury First Amendment: "the marketplace of ideas."
Because it represents a distinct break from the immediate past, it is
easy to misconceive Holmes's metaphor as a creative tour de force.72
But one of the fascinating things about Holmes's metaphor is that it is
actually derived from the most conventional metaphors for mind and
ideas. (See Figure C) Commonly referred to as the CONDUIT metaphor
system,73 these conceptual metaphors include:
• THE MIND IS A CONTAINER;
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS;
WORDS ARE CONTAINERS;
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING;
• UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.
These general conceptual metaphors can be used to generate additional
metaphors by specifying the source domain entity with a related kind of
entity that provides a different set of entailments. Thus, we have the
conventional conceptual metaphors:
69. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
70. Id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 630.
72. See David Cole, Agon at the Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment
Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 879 (1986).
73. See Michael J. Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language About Language, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 284 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed.
1993). Reddy provides a "partial listing" of 141 examples. Id. at 286-306.
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THE MIND IS A MACHINE-she just grinds out those papers; I got a lot
of writing done this morning but then I ran out of steam; he had a
nervous breakdown;
IDEAS ARE PRODUCTS-that's a good hypothesis, but we need to refine
it; she is our most productive writer;
IDEAS ARE COMMODITIES-her idea is valuable, but yours is worthless;
it just won't sell. 4
Holmes's marketplace of ideas metaphor combines these basic metaphors
for mind and ideas with the economic experience of the market to create
a novel conception of free speech. The metaphor expresses a new idea,
but only by means of entirely conventional conceptual metaphors.
Figure C
CONDUIT metaphor: Mapping
Source Domain Target Domain
Physical >>> Mental
object >>> ideas
seeing >>> knowing
container (vehicle) >>> words
content >>> ideational content
sending >>> communicating
grasping (receiving) >>> understanding
container (receptacle) >>> mind
What is this new view of free speech, and how is it dependent on the
market metaphor? The metaphor of a "market" for speech carries over
to the domain of expression a systematic set of entailments that
supersedes the limitations of the older model. (See Figure D) With
respect to entities and relations, the entailments are that ideas are
commodities, persuasion is selling, speakers are vendors, the audience
members are potential purchasers, acceptance is buying, intellectual
value is monetary value, and the struggle for recognition in the domain
of public opinion is like competition in the market. At the conceptual
level, the metaphor carries over the notion that truth-value like
economic value can be measured by "the power of the thought to get
itself accepted." 5 Finally, at the normative level, the metaphor carries
over from the source domain of economic activity to the target domain
74. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE By 27-28, 47-48 (2d ed.
2001).
75. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of speech the contingent cultural values of freedom and individual
autonomy that constitute our modern notion of "free trade."
This last point is easily taken for granted today, but this conception
only became possible as a result of unrelated historical and cultural
changes in economic practices. In an earlier time, the market metaphor
bore a nearly opposite meaning. Thus, in the Areopagitica, Milton
invoked the market metaphor to deride the notion of licensed printing:
"Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopoliz'd and
traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to
make a staple commodity of all knowledge in the Land, to mark and
licence it like our broad cloath, and our wooll packs."76 Milton wrote
in an era of imperial mercantilism when the market was tightly
regulated by the Crown and by the guilds. Holmes, in contrast, wrote
in a period of laissez-faire capitalism (which, ironically, is conventionally
identified with the majority opinion in Lochner). If Holmes was
skeptical of the notion of truth as the inexorable outcome of the forward
motion of ideas, the concept of the market provided a meaningful
alternative model for the notion that truth-like economic well-being-
could be the product of human competition. In short, the marketplace
of ideas makes sense as a metaphor for free speech only after the advent
of the economic developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
Figure D
"Marketplace of Ideas" Mapping
Source Domain Target Domain
economic markets >>> speech
commodities >>> ideas
selling >>> persuasion
vendors >>> speakers
customers >>> audience
buying >>> acceptance
economic value >>> intellectual or truth value
market competition >>> competition for public
opinion
free trade >>> free speech
This, moreover, was not the only cultural shift that stood between
Milton and the Framers, on one hand, and Holmes and the twentieth-
century First Amendment, on the other. As long as truth was under-
76. Milton, supra note 53, at 303-04.
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stood in strong objectivist terms, a First Amendment that prohibits only
censorship made some sense. After-the-fact judgments could be trusted
to sort out the true from the false and unprotected. The rise of classical
liberalism in the nineteenth century undermined this view because it
brought with it the notion that there could be more than one truth."
As Leonard Levy observes: "Neither freedom of speech nor freedom of
the press could become a civil liberty until people believed that the truth
of their opinions, especially their religious opinions, was relative rather
than absolute."7 8 Recognition of the relativity of value, in turn,
subverts faith in the power of truth to sustain itself against all comers.
Thus, the discontinuity between the Framers' First Amendment, with its
focus on the prohibition of prior restraints and the introduction of truth
as a defense to charges of seditious libel, and the modern First
Amendment, with its more libertarian emphasis, is a function of the
radically different social contexts and the distinctive concepts they each
make possible. Modern free speech doctrine simply was not possible
before the development of the modern practices and beliefs that give it
meaning.
In both these ways, Holmes did not act free-form in fashioning the
marketplace of ideas metaphor. Rather, he drew upon conventional
metaphors and general cultural experience to formulate a new concep-
tion of free speech. Even so, Holmes's innovation was not immediately
successful: it would be another decade before a First Amendment
plaintiff actually prevailed79 and a full fifty years before Holmes's "clear
and present danger" test would actually command a majority of the
Court.
80
77. A first step along this road was the realization of human fallibility. See, e.g., JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-22 (C.V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859) ("To refuse a hearing to an
opinion because they are sure that it is false is to assume that their certainty is the same
thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.").
78. LEVY, supra note 51, at 5.
79. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (voiding state statute prohibiting
display of red flag); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931) (striking down state
infringement on freedom of the press). The expansion of First Amendment freedoms picked
up steam in the late New Deal and post-War periods. See generally Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
80. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), with Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding Smith Act prosecutions of communist party leaders).
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III. SPEECH ACTS OR SEX ACTS?
We saw how the metaphor of truth as a "streaming fountain" was
neither subjective nor mere rhetoric, but, in fact, structured a different
and more limited conception of free speech than that which prevails
today. By the same token, Holmes's market metaphor both makes
possible and limits the scope of First Amendment expansion. The
modern First Amendment, in other words, forms a radial category
that-both for good and ill-is structured by the market model and its
underlying conceptual metaphors.
The heart of modern free speech law consists, in Justice Brennan's oft-
quoted words, in the "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."8' But this commitment makes little sense outside the normative
cultural assumptions encompassed by the market metaphor. As Holmes
observed, competition is hardly appreciated when "you have no doubt of
your premises." 2 One might just as well invite submissions for a
contest to define the proper shape of a square. Vigorous competition
becomes desirable, even indispensable, once one accepts the relativist
notion that "there is no such thing as a false idea."" Thus, Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan84 affirmed
that First Amendment "protection does not turn upon 'the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.'"
85
Just as the economic market knows no test of product "validity," but
allows demand to drive supply (relying on the market to distinguish
between viable and shoddy products), the constitutional regime of free
speech works best when it "secure[s] 'the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.'"8"
Yet this otherwise expansive concept of free speech can at times be
surprisingly narrow. Speech is expected to be "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" in the freewheeling space of the public forum; but in more
circumscribed contexts, there is more limited space for speech. Thus, in
striking down a statute prohibiting picketing on its grounds, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the "sidewalks comprising the outer
boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other
81. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
82. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
83. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85. Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 455 (1963)).
86. Id. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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sidewalks in Washington, D.C."87  An earlier decision upholding
restrictions on anti-war protests in the public areas of Fort Dix was
different because "the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within
an enclosed military reservation... and were thus separated from the
streets and sidewalks of any municipality."88 Under the quasi-public
forum doctrine, the government may restrict the content of speech in
institutional settings as long as it does not discriminate amongst
viewpoints.8 9 In practice, this means that a government employer can
ban (or punish as insubordinate) communications about work-related
grievances or union activities.90 As Robert Post says, "the legally
established boundaries of public discourse mark the point at which our
commitments shift from values like autonomous self-determination to
competing values like ... managerial efficiency."
The overt spatialization of free speech is not the only way in which our
understanding of the First Amendment is shaped by the market
metaphor. Equally important is the distinction between speech and
conduct, which continues to play a role in contemporary free speech law
notwithstanding its rejection by leading constitutional law scholars such
as Larry Tribe and John Hart Ely.92 As they have argued, the distinc-
87. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 52-53
(1983) ("The Court of Appeals would have been correct if a public forum were involved here.
But the internal mail system is not a public forum."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
750-51 (1978) ("[Wlhen ... a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of... regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S, 828, 838
(1976) ("The notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks,
have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of
thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false."); see also Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980) ("Any student of history who
has been reprimanded for talking about the World Series during a class discussion of the
First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state that a 'time, place, or manner
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.'")
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion).
90. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); see Perry, 460 U.S. at 52-53.
91. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1278
(1995) (emphasis added) (internal quotes omitted).
92. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 598 (1st ed. 1978);
John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975). For an
earlier articulation of this point, see Louis Henkin, The 1967 Supreme Court
Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968) ("A constitutional
distinction between speech and conduct is specious .... [The] meaningful constitutional
distinction is ... between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of
conduct.").
MERCER LAW REVIEW
tion between "speech" and "conduct" is incoherent because, on one hand,
all speech involves action of some sort (talking, writing, printing, etc.)
and, on the other, many forms of conduct (wearing an armband,
displaying or defacing a flag, participating in a sit-in or demonstration)
are primarily expressive. Not only is the distinction indefensible on
rational grounds, but it is deeply problematic as a legal matter:
solicitation to commit a crime or the libel of a private person can be
prohibited even though they are undoubtedly speech; but symbolic
actions, like flag burning, are treated as speech for First Amendment
purposes notwithstanding the fact that they are unquestionably conduct.
Nevertheless, progressive scholars who support regulation of hate
speech and pornography regularly invoke the 1942 "fighting words"
doctrine of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,93 which recognized
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace."
The argument for prohibitions on racist speech is that it is a form of
harrassment or "words that wound." Similarly, Cass Sunstein has relied
on Chaplinsky to argue that pornography is "low value" speech that can
be prohibited consistent with the First Amendment because it harms
women by encouraging violence toward them.95 The essential idea in
both cases is that some forms of speech are subject to regulation because
they are tantamount to conduct.
The continued invocation of and reliance on Chaplinsky and its
speech/conduct distinction is, thus, doubly paradoxical. On one hand,
the persistence of the distinction in the face of such an eminent and
seemingly powerful critique suggests that it must be an entrenched part
of our conceptual system. On the other hand, the ineffectiveness of legal
arguments premised on that entrenched distinction would seem to
indicate that the mere conventionality of a legal metaphor is not
sufficient to make it persuasive.
93. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (permitting regulation of certain categories of speech
because, in part, "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth").
94. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
95. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606-
07 [hereinafter Sunstein, Pornography]. In a subsequent treatment of this issue, Sunstein
abandoned the argument that pornography is more like conduct than speech. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHi. L. REV. 795, 808 (1993).
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We can get some purchase on this paradox by examining the way in
which Sunstein dances with the very distinction he purports to reject.
In response to criticism of an early version of his argument for the
regulation of pornography, Sunstein specifically disclaimed any reliance
on the "discredited and untenable distinction between 'speech' and
'conduct."' 6  But, in point of fact, he employed just that notion:
"[Plornography does not have the special properties that single out
speech for special protection; it is more akin to a sexual aid than a
communicative expression."97  Although Sunstein maintains that
"pornography and obscenity are obviously 'speech,' 9 8 his argument
nevertheless reduces to the claim that pornography is nothing more than
a physical stimulus: "What makes pornography different," he says, "is
that people 'get off on it.'"99
For the conventional legal scholar given to criterial logic, the idea is
to take the things-in-the-world called speech and conduct and try to
identify the distinguishing features that differentiate one from the other.
When these scholars find that all forms of speech present the properties
of conduct and some forms of conduct are characterized by the same
properties that identify speech as such, they are forced to conclude that
the categories speech and conduct are not useful as concepts. But the
distinction between speech and conduct persists nevertheless because
this literal and propositional approach misses the point. The concepts
speech and conduct are not literal, but metaphorical and socially
motivated. The distinction persists because there are fundamental
structural links between the CONDUIT metaphor and the general
conceptual metaphor ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS. In this metaphor, the
experience of physical motion is mapped onto abstract social or
intellectual actions. The mapping is systematic, which means that each
of the entailments from the domain of physical mobility-the experience
of blockage, containment, and movement through space toward desired
objects-is also carried over to the target domain of abstract social
action. This mapping thus yields a series of correlative metaphors, in
which:
CONSTRAINTS ON ACTION ARE CONSTRAINTS ON MOTION;
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS;
IMPEDIMENTS TO PURPOSES ARE OBSTACLES TO MOTION.
96. Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment and Cognition:A Response, 1989 DUKE L.J.
433, 436.
97. Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 95, at 606 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 603 n.84.
99. Sunstein, supra note 96, at 434.
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In a corollary of these metaphors, life is conceptualized as a purposive
journey. This yields expression like "it's time to get on with your life"
and "I overcame my problem with alcohol.""°
Since speech too is an activity, it is also conceptualized by means of
the ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS metaphor (hence, such colloquialisms as "he
talks a mile a minute" or "he talks a blue streak."). Even more
importantly, several of the metaphorical mappings that constitute the
CONDUIT metaphor-system are themselves premised on the ACTIONS ARE
MOTIONS metaphor. The metaphors UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING,
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING, and AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY each
represent a different aspect of the communicative process as a kind of
action.
Because speech is conceptualized metaphorically in this way, there is
a sense in which, for us, all speech is action: just as any word that
signifies physical acquisition can be used to signify intellectual
understanding, any speech act can be represented as conduct. Thus, it
is perfectly conventional to refer to an unkind word as "a cutting
remark" and to say that a presentation was "powerful," "forceful," or that
it "bowled me over."'' In legal debate, this conventional metaphorical
notion of SPEECH AS ACTION is manifested in the arguments that hate
speech is a matter of words that wound or the Chaplinsky notion that
"fighting words" are words which by their very utterance inflict injury.
It does not follow that, as Tribe says, any particular course of behavior
can arbitrarily be characterized as either speech or conduct. Concepts
like speech and conduct are not simply categories of things-as-they-exist-
in-the-world; they are categorizations of social experience that reflect our
speech-community's particular social understandings and purposes-the
way we live, the things we value, the norms we obey. They are an
essential part of "what everybody knows" about the social world. For
example, in his dissent in Cohen v. California,°2 Justice Blackmun
characterized Cohen's "Fuck the Draft" as "mainly conduct and little
speech."0 3 By today's post-MTV, post-rap standards, Justice Black-
mun's categorization seems remarkably quaint-if not, in fact, absurd.
For this categorization to succeed, it must appeal to generally accepted
100. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 41-44; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 4-7, 11-12
(1989).
101. In the same vein, a joke or a story is said to have a "punchline." Consider, too,
the philosopher Richard Rorty's remark that "tossing a metaphor into a conversation is
like suddenly ... slapping your interlocutor's face, or kissing him." RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 18 (1989).
102. 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
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understandings and beliefs. And Blackmun's argument does not
persuade precisely because it relies on genteel, largely old-fashioned
sensibilities that few today share. Conversely, murder will readily and
reliably be characterized as conduct no matter how earnest the intended
message of hatred or how obvious the political motivation, as in the
Oklahoma City bombings. It is not that we cannot imagine a society
where assassination is a mode of political expression: there have been
cultures in which assassination was a regular means of determining
succession. It is just that we are not (and do not particularly want to be)
that kind of society. The categories speech and conduct are not infinitely
manipulable because they are grounded in existing social practices and,
as such, are reflections of cultural values and pragmatic social purposes.
Whether a speech act will be perceived as conduct or a course of
conduct understood as speech depends upon its congruence with an
idealized cognitive model structured in terms of the CONDUIT metaphor.
A speech act that uses words or "symbolic conduct" to transmit a
message to an audience-that is, one that instantiates the metaphors
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS; WORDS (AND SYMBOLS) ARE CONTAINERS; COMMUNICA-
TION IS SENDING; UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING-will be understood as
speech. Thus, in 1968 the Court held that conduct is to be protected as
"symbolic speech" when there is "[an intent to convey a particularized
message . . ., and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it." 10
4
Conversely, a speech act that in social context and use is little more
than a metaphorical OBJECT hurled at another like a brickbat' will
always be open to characterization as conduct that should be excluded
from the protections of the First Amendment. Speech acts that do not
fit the ICM will be characterized based on their proximity to one or the
other of these prototypical cases. Thus, as Post points out, there are
instances of speech such as music and nonrepresentational art that all
would agree are core cases of protected expression even if no one can say
exactly what the message might be.' We can observe the Court
stumbling on just this point in its decision in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston.'0 7 Struggling to explain
why a St. Patrick's Day Parade with no identifiable message was
104. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11(1968); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989) (the first flag burning case).
105. Hence the derivation of "brickbat"-literally a piece of a brick used as a
missile-as an unkind or caustic criticism.
106. Post, supra note 91, at 1252-53.
107. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
2006] 893
MERCER LAW REVIEW
nevertheless protected speech, the Court proclaimed: "Parades are...
a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of
marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest march-
es. 108
Speech, in other words, is a radial category whose central case is
characterized by the CONDUIT metaphor-system and its cognate, the
marketplace of ideas.'0 9 Speaking, writing, and publishing are the
prototypical cases. First-tier extensions include the protest march and
the demonstration, relatively early additions that differ from the central
case because they involve conduct implicating pragmatic concerns
(traffic, congestion) that justify reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. Second-tier extensions include the nonprint media and
symbolic and commercial speech. Thus, the broadcast media are subject
to legal mandates-the fairness doctrine, the regulation of indecent, but
nonobscene language-that would not be tolerated for more prototypical
media. 0 Symbolic speech (e.g., draftcard burning) may be restricted
under a more relaxed standard that permits the government to pursue
"important" interests unrelated to speech.' So, too, the protection of
commercial speech allows for regulation of false and misleading
108. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
109. Thus, when Sunstein finally abandons the speech/conduct distinction in his
argument for the regulation of pornography, see Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra
note 95 at 808, he inevitably (and unwittingly) replaces it with the conventional CONDUIT
metaphor. The speech/conduct distinction, he says, is merely an heuristic: On one hand,
"speech' refers to something that we should consider a term of art" covering "all symbols
that are intended and received as messages." Id. at 833. On the other, "the treatment of
some words as 'conduct' provides a shorthand, if misleading, description of a more extended
argument that the speech at issue does not promote First Amendment values and creates
sufficient harms to be regulable under the appropriate standards." Id. at 837. But, in
characterizing "speech" as a "term of art," Sunstein implies that the concept has a
specifically legal meaning when, in fact, there is no meaning to the concept "speech" that
is not governed by the social understandings comprised by the CONDUIT metaphor: In his
own words, the term "speech .. . covers all symbols that are intended and received as
niessages." Id. at 833 (emphasis added). As we have seen, moreover, this purportedly
legal definition does not in fact explain why music, nonrepresentational art, or cases like
Hurley should count as "speech."
110. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), with Miami Herald
Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (newspaper cannot be required to publish
retraction of erroneous story). Red Lion is particularly problematic when one considers the
now-conventional point that cable has rendered irrelevant the traditional justification about
the scarcity of the airwaves. For the Court's more recent treatment of the cable system,
see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) ("Cable programmers and
cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of
the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment"). On indecency, see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (the "seven dirty words" case).
111. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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advertising.12 On the other hand, an event like the St. Patrick's Day
parade may not have a discrete message; but as an expression of identity
or ethnic solidarity, it is more like a manifesto than a brickbat.
As one moves further yet from the core, First Amendment protections
progressively weaken. Novel forms of political protest and nonprototyp-
ical instances of the traditional media receive little or no protection.
When, for example, those protesting the plight of the homeless wanted
to sleep overnight in a tent city set up across from the White House in
Lafayette Park, the Court sustained the application of an Interior
Department anticamping regulation as a reasonable "time, place, or
manner" restriction.' By the same token, student newspapers are
not treated as core cases of speech, but are subject to regulation as part
of the core curriculum."4 Many of these cases are difficult to square
in conventional terms of doctrine and principle. Mark Tushnet, for
example, has complained that the Court's decisions appear to imply that
"we are to determine the degree of protection that a category of speech
gets by considering paradigmatic examples of speech in that category,
not by considering unusual or merely possible examples."" 5 But these
outcomes are quite understandable as prototype effects-that is, as the
predictable products of radial categorization.
The point is that the questions of whether parades, pornography, or
works of art are speech are difficult only in the abstract. Law, as
illustrated by all of these examples, is contingent on the larger social
practices and forms of life. This was what Llewellyn meant when he
argued that the Constitution "is in first instance a set of ways of living
and doing."" 6 Robert Post makes much the same point with respect
to the First Amendment when he says that the constitutional values it
serves "inhere not in speech as such, but rather in particular social
112. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
113. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984). For another
explanation that relates the Court's reasoning to our historical conceptions of the park, see
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1881 (1991).
114. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). Of course, one can
question the Court's characterization of the school paper as part of the core curriculum.
But, in relating the student paper to an alternative ICM, the Court's characterization
seems a rather clear example of what, in chapter 6 of A Clearing in the Forest, supra note
*, I identify as an assimilation-to-prototype effect.
115. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN
CONSTrruTIoNAL LAw 307 (1987). Characteristically, he proclaims this approach
"analytically unsatisfying" and "likely to be manipulated." Id. at 309.
116. Llewellyn, supra note 37, at 17.
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practices.""' If today we find "in" the First Amendment such values
as liberty, democracy, autonomy, tolerance, and self-expression, it is
because those are the values that we enact in diverse and pervasive
contemporary practices.
With this in mind, it should be easy enough to see why pornography
is speech. Ours is a society that uses sex to sell everything: not just
toothpaste and tabloids, but also Charles Dickens's Great Expectations
"in which Gwyneth Paltrow can be seen wearing-surprise-no
clothes.""' In a culture with a voracious appetite for "news" of the
former President's dalliances-an obsession which dominated the halls
of government no less than the headlines n 9 -it is little wonder that
sexually explicit material is seen as a subject of constitutional protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
The standard Western oppositions-mind and body, reason and the
passions, logic and rhetoric, objective and subjective-are central to both
our understanding and misunderstanding of law. They are basic to our
understanding of law as a set of rules intended to govern the behavior
of legal subjects. But, ironically, it is these very oppositions that
structure the modern preoccupation-if not, indeed, puzzlement--over
whether there are any meaningful constraints on judicial subjectivity.
Just as objectivism (specifically, a correspondence view of meaning)
introduces the problem of skepticism (How do we know that our
perceptions accurately "reflect" the external world? Perhaps, as in
Hillary Putnam's wry hypothetical,"2 we are just brains in a vat fed
input by a giant computer?), the preoccupation with reason (more
precisely, the subject/object dichotomy) creates the problem of indetermi-
nacy: if decisionmaking is not constrained by the objective logic of the
law, then it follows that judges will be free to decide subjectively
according to their personal desires, politics, or value-preferences. After
all, without the constraint of a rationalizing principle or some set of
necessary and sufficient criteria, any two cases can be made to seem
alike or different in any number of ways.
117. Post, supra note 91, at 1250.
118. Terry Teachout, Op-Ed., Classics That Sizzle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at A13
(noting that "the film industry's latest fling with the classics is being driven by [the]
equation: Famous Title + Naked Babes - Author's Original Dialogue = Box Office Smash").
119. James Bennet, In Washington, There's Still Only One Topic of Conversation, N.Y.
TnsS, Mar. 19, 1998, at Al ("[I]t is the sexual content of the accusations now that is
sustaining press and public attention at fever pitch, in the view of White House advisers
and other political experts here.") (emphasis ommitted).
120. HILLARY PuTNAM, REASON, TRuTH AND HIsTORY 5-8 (1981).
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It is, of course, these same oppositions that underlie the conventional
distrust of legal metaphor as subjective, rhetorical, imprecise, and
unreliable. Only precise principles and criteria can anchor objective
decisionmaking; metaphor, in contrast, is fancy talk that-though
sometimes useful and evocative-must be cashed out in the hard
currency of fact lest it obscure reason and mask subjective decision-
making.
121
But here, too, the conventional wisdom is the ironic source of its own
undoing. The supposed subjectivity and unreliability of legal metaphor
is an artifact of the very opposition between objective and subjective,
logic and rhetoric, mind and body in whose name metaphor is decried.
Actual examination of legal metaphors-how they work, how they come
to be, how they come to be meaningful and persuasive to us as embodied,
socially-situated human beings-shows that just the contrary is true:
metaphor is both the product and embodiment of constraint. The import
of our examination of the "stream of commerce" and "marketplace of
ideas" metaphors is: first, that metaphorical thought is actually orderly
and systematic in operation; second, that metaphorical legal concepts
(like all concepts) depend for their coherence and persuasiveness on the
motivating social contexts that ground meaning; and, third, that legal
change (no less than stability) is contingent on-and, therefore,
constrained by-the social practices and forms of life that give the law
its shape and meaning.
In short, what our examination of these legal metaphors shows is that
legal imagination and constraint are not the opposed qualities they are
thought to be, but a single human process. Metaphor, in other words,
reintegrates us with ourselves. An appreciation of metaphorical reason
paradoxically (and, from the perspective of Western philosophy,
"metaphorical thought" is already paradoxical) reconciles freedom and
constraint as mutually constitutive. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty puts it,
"without the roots which it thrusts into the world, it would not be
freedom at all. " 1
22
121. See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1155, 1157 (2005); David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1205,
1214-15 (1991) (metaphor "is useful because it is evocative, but it may evoke different ideas
in different readers. It liberates the author from some of the rigidity of exposition, but also
from the demands of precision and clarity."); Cf. LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS viii (1967)
("When all goes well and established legal rules encompass neatly the social life they are
intended to regulate, there is little occasion for fictions.").
122. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 456 (Colin Smith
trans., 1962).
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